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“They cry Peace, Peace, but there is no peace.”  Jeremiah’s complaint resounds 
loudly in a period in which many of the most intractable social conflicts are products 
not just of prejudice, malice, or misunderstanding, but also of the normal operations of 
structurally violent systems.  This essay begins by outlining and modifying the theory 
of structural violence originally presented by Johan Galtung.  It goes on to describe 
several types of conflict-generating systems, including the capitalist economy that 
produces crime and mass incarceration and the neo-empire that produces terrorism 
and the “war on terror.”  Finally, it inquires into the responsibility of would-be conflict 
resolvers for system transformation, stressing the need for new forms of conflict 
resolution theory and practice, and suggesting several processes that might help to 
satisfy this need. 
 
Structural Violence as a Problem for Peacemakers 
In a recent book, I suggested that the field of conflict resolution has 
experienced three “waves” of praxis, each of which continues to influence thinking and 
practice among would-be peacemakers.3  In the first wave, conflict was thought of 
primarily as a clash of interests that could be managed or resolved through warfare, 
power-based negotiation, or various forms of alternative dispute resolution.  Conflict 
resolvers of the second wave pictured serious conflict as a product of unsatisfied human 
needs, arguing that basic needs for identity, belonging, security, and development 
could be satisfied only by collaborative processes that produced significant changes in 
intergroup relationships.  The third wave of praxis, which is now gaining momentum, 
sees conflict emanating from violent social systems that, so far from being 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
3 Resolving Structural Conflicts: How Violent Systems Can Be Transformed (Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2017), 36-44, 53 et seq. The publisher’s permission to use material from 
the book in this essay is gratefully acknowledged. 
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“dysfunctional,” produce bitter intergroup strife as a predictable feature of their 
normal operations.  Which forms of peacemaking are appropriate to deal with 
structural conflicts is a disputed issue, but the peacemaker’s responsibility in 
such cases seems clear: it is to assist conflicting parties to replace or restructure 
the violence-producing system.             
The theoretical progenitor of the third wave was the Norwegian peace 
theorist, polymath, and gadfly Johan Galtung.  Almost fifty years ago, Galtung 
published an article in The Journal of Peace Research that introduced the idea of 
structural violence to the conflict studies field.  Structural violence, he stated, is 
force or influence exerted in accordance with patterned social arrangements 
that prevent people from realizing their human potential and satisfying basic 
developmental needs.4  Unlike direct violence, which involves one person acting 
to harm another, it is indirect and may or may not involve people acting 
deliberately.  If I withhold food from you intending to starve you to death, that 
is direct violence.  If the system of food production delivers food only to those 
who can afford to pay for it, and you starve because you can’t afford the price, 
that violence is structural.  In both cases, “individuals may be killed or 
mutilated . . . hit or hurt . . . and manipulated by means of stick or carrot 
strategies.”  But, where structural violence takes place, “The violence is built 
into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal 
life chances.”5  Of course, this sort of violence need not take a form as dramatic 
as the physical starvation of one of the system’s “bottom dogs.”  Stressing the 
difference between human potentiality and actuality means that preventing a 
child from going to school or a woman from working out of the home should 
also be considered violent, at least where these restrictions are avoidable.      
There are three primary reasons for expanding the usual common sense 
definition of violence to include structural components.  The first is that it 
renders visible forms of destruction which many people in relatively static 
societies consider natural, hence invisible:  
 
In a static society, personal violence will be registered, whereas 
structural violence may be seen as about as natural as the air around 
us. Conversely, in a highly dynamic society, personal violence may 
be seen as wrong and harmful, but still somehow congruent with the 
order of things, whereas structural violence becomes apparent 
because it stands out like an enormous rock in a creek, impeding the 
free flow, creating all kinds of eddies and turbulences.6  
 
     Second, the concept provides a corrective to a common view that the 
first parties in conflict to resort to direct violence are breakers of the peace, 
when, as to them, the apparent peace is often already violent.  (One thinks of 
                                                            
4 “Violence exists when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and 
mental realizations are below their potential realizations.” Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and 
Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research, 6:3 (1969), 167-191 at 168.  In “Cultural Violence,” 
Journal of Peace Research, 27:3 (1990), 291-305, at 292, he reframed this definition as “avoidable 
insults to basic human needs.”  
5 Johan Galtung, op. cit., 170-171. 
6 Ibid., 173. 
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terrorist attacks in the West, which local residents consider virtually 
unprovoked breaches of the peace, but which are often done to retaliate for 
attacks by Western forces in other regions.)  Conflict begins with an “avoidable 
insult to human needs,” not with one’s response to the insult.  In fact, a 
reciprocal causal relationship between direct violence and structural violence 
exists in which each form tends to provoke or generate the other.  Third and 
finally, “an extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace.”  
If the absence of direct violence, at least for the time being, can be considered 
peace in a negative sense, the absence of structural violence and the 
replacement of abusive or exploitative relationships by valued, mutually 
rewarding relationships should be considered “positive peace.” 7 
     Although Johan Galtung’s detractors joked that the activist scholar had 
redefined violence to include everything he did not like, his definition of 
structural violence is coherent enough.  His theory makes it clear that the 
systems which administer and provoke violence can be political and cultural as 
well as socioeconomic, but it puts considerably more emphasis on the unequal 
distribution of socioeconomic power than do many other approaches.  Under 
capitalism, he notes, the distribution of resources, including income, education, 
and medical services, is grossly unequal, with “rank dimensions . . . tied 
together in the social structure.”   
In other words, as Karl Marx had said, society is sharply divided into 
classes: Marxist criticism of capitalist society emphasizes how power to decide 
over the surplus from the production process is reserved for the owners of the 
means of production, who then can buy themselves into top positions on all 
other rank dimensions because money is highly convertible in a capitalist 
society – if you have money to convert, that is. 
Galtung then goes on to cite, apparently with approval, the liberal 
critique that “socialist” (i.e., Stalinized) systems also concentrate economic 
power in a few hands, thus opening the door to structural violence from non-
capitalist regimes as well. 8  His dislike of vertically ranked systems clearly 
extends to those whose advocates declare themselves to be leftists.  Even so, 
his social vision, departing from the generally accepted assumption that the 
capitalist ‘free market’ is the final stage of socioeconomic development, owes a 
great deal to Marxist and post-Marxist traditions of critical analysis.    
Galtung’s passion for social equality eventually produced a famous 
exchange of views between the Norwegian polymath and an equally acute and 
energetic British colleague, Kenneth E. Boulding.  In 1977, Boulding produced 
“Twelve Friendly Quarrels With Johan Galtung,” an essay that, as Galtung 
pointed out in a reply published a decade later (“Only One Quarrel With 
Kenneth Boulding”), boils down to a single large disagreement over the 
necessity of transforming elitist social structures.9  Essentially accusing 
                                                            
7 Ibid., 183. 
8 Ibid., 171. Galtung does not discuss socialist alternatives to Stalinism, either Trotskyist, 
Bukharinist, or anarcho-syndicalist, perhaps because of his deep commitment to Gandhian 
nonviolence and the values of social democracy.  
9 Kenneth E.  Boulding, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels With Johan Galtung.” Journal of Peace 
Research, 14:1 (1977), 75-86; Johan Galtung, “Only One Quarrel With Kenneth Boulding.” 
Journal of Peace Research, 24: 2 (Jun., 1987), 199-203.     
10
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Galtung of being a Marxist without portfolio, Boulding criticized his insistence 
that violence is deeply related to social inequality and cannot be reduced 
significantly without eliminating exploitation and repression.  On the contrary, 
Boulding maintained, since violence and poverty (or powerlessness) derive 
from different sources, equalizing social positions will not necessarily have the 
potent peacemaking effects predicted by Galtung.  His own perspective, which 
he termed “evolutionary,” suggested that society is developing autonomously, 
in accordance with entropic laws, in the direction of “human betterment.”  The 
implication (distantly reminiscent of Burke’s objections to the French 
Revolution) was that deliberate attempts to restructure social institutions are 
likely to interfere with this natural process.  In his reply, Galtung insisted that 
greater social and political equality is not just one long-term goal, among 
many.  It is a sine qua non for the resolution of structural conflicts and the 
creation of positive peace.  
        Of course, this exchange left many questions unanswered.  A less 
sweeping critique of Galtung’s approach might have noted that, despite some 
intriguing speculation about the relationship between structural and direct 
violence, his essay did not clearly indicate the conditions under which the 
former is likely to produce the latter, or vice versa.  When (if ever) will an 
unjust or oppressive social system produce violent rebellion?  When (if ever) 
will the spread of personal violence generate violent repression?  Adding the 
social-structural dimension to psychologically based theories such as human 
needs, relative deprivation, and historical trauma brings the answers to such 
questions closer, but still leaves a large area indeterminate and subject to 
influence by multiple variables.  For this reason, some analysts (including 
Galtung himself in later works) have employed psycho-political notions like 
Paolo Freire’s theory of “conscientization” to explain why passive victims of 
social injustice sometimes – but far from always – become active resisters or 
rebels.10   
              In addition, Galtung offered two important concepts that help explain 
how one form of violence can be converted into the other: nested systems and 
cultural violence. To illustrate nested systems, consider the prison, which one 
can describe as a violence-generating system based on structural inequality and 
the non-satisfaction of human needs.  Even before going behind bars, most 
prison inmates-to-be already live in an “iron cage”: a society organized so as to 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the poor, people of color, and members of 
other marginalized groups living in certain communities to get a decent 
education, hold a remunerative job, feel safe and at peace with others, or enjoy 
a satisfying family life.  We know that poverty and income inequality gestate 
crime, and that crime gestates prisons.11  Prisons, in turn, recycle prisoners, 
                                                            
10 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness (1974) (London and New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013).  See also Jolle Demmers, Theories of Violent Conflict (Oxford and New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 61-61, 77-87. 
11 See Jeffrey Reiman and Paul Leighton, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: 
Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice, 10th Ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); 
Gregg Barak, et al., Class, Race, Gender and Crime: The Social Realities of Justice in America, 
3d Ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).  For a cross-national study of the causes 
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sending them impoverished and stigmatized into structurally violent 
environments that insure that a substantial majority of them will be arrested 
again within three years.12  This situation illustrates the fact that social 
systems almost never exist in isolation; to use Galtung’s metaphor, they are 
nested like “Chinese boxes.” 13  Each system may form part of a larger 
structure, a tendency that becomes more pronounced as the social world 
(including structures of domination) becomes more interconnected on a global 
scale.  As a result, the inequalities associated with structural violence appear 
and are aggravated at all levels from the local to the national, regional, and 
international.   
       Within these nested systems, Galtung points out, structural violence 
and direct violence “crossbreed.”  Repressive structures generate rebellion, 
crime, and self-destructive behaviors such as suicide and substance abuse, while 
rebellious acts incubate repressive institutions and punitive norms.  To 
illustrate how this crossbreeding occurs, the theorist introduces a third element 
of the conflict triangle, cultural violence, defined as “those aspects of culture . . . 
that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.” 14  The 
cultural products that he considers especially potent in this regard are religion, 
ideology, language, art, science, and cosmology, although he might also have 
noted the peculiar importance in today’s world of narrative forms, including 
the graphic arts (films, videogames, images and stories shared on social media), 
as well as the subconscious imagery explored by psychoanalysts like Freud, 
Jung, and Lacan.  Like Pierre Bourdieu, who sees “symbolic violence” as 
authority’s most effective tool, Galtung stresses the extent to which cultural 
conditioning maintains the oppressive structures that end by provoking and 
delivering violence:   
The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing 
exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them 
(particularly not exploitation) at all. Then come the eruptions, the efforts to use 
direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage . . . and counter-violence to 
keep the cage intact.15 
                                                            
of crime, see Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, “What causes violent 
crime?”  European Economic Review 46 (2002), 1323-1357. 
12 U.S. Department of Justice, Special Report: Multistate Criminal History Patterns of Prisoners 
Released in 30 States (September 2015). 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mschpprts05.pdf 
13 A somewhat similar concept, “intersocietal systems,” is developed by Anthony Giddens in 
The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1984), 164, 244.  See also Maire Dugan, “A Nested Theory of 
Conflict.” Leadership Journal: Women in Leadership – Sharing the Vision, 1:1 (Summer 1996), 
14. 
14 Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” op. cit. at 291.  Of course, cultural violence can also be 
considered structural, since culture is patterned and institutionalized.  See, for example, John R. 
Hall, “Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical Explanation,” History and Theory, 
39:3 (Oct., 2000), 331-347.  
15 Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” op. cit. at 295.  “Iron cage” is from Max Weber’s The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 123. 
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Other commentators, noting that cultural ideas and practices tend to 
lag behind changes in the system of production, consider deep-rooted 
socioeconomic shifts the primary causal factor.16  But the causes can flow in any 
direction once the triangle – an integrated violent system – has been 
established.  Moreover, Galtung’s theory points to the fact that the generation 
and crossbreeding of violent conflict can take place in a wide variety of social 
systems.  The family, school, workplace, religious community, nation, and 
empire – all can become sites and producers of direct, structural, and cultural 
violence.  This is especially likely to happen under certain conditions, which 
will be described differently, of course, by those challenging the system and 
those defending it.  What are those conditions?  And, what sorts of violent 
system do they produce?  
The Varieties of Violent Systems 
From the perspective of those challenging a sociopolitical system they 
deem oppressive, violence erupts when: 
(a) a system marked by a seriously unequal and inequitable distribution 
of wealth, power, or honor  
(b) fails to satisfy the basic needs or legitimate expectations of 
disadvantaged groups at a time when:  
(c) these groups have become strongly convinced of the legitimacy of 
their basic needs and expectations, and  
(d) systemic injustice has become manifest to them despite the 
ideological and cultural weapons usually employed to justify or disguise 
it.       
        From the perspective of the system’s defenders or deniers, on the other 
hand, violence is likely to erupt when: 
(a) groups alienated and embittered by their failure to succeed in society 
and/or their self-destructive ideas and lifestyles 
(b) are manipulated by ambitious leaders to believe that their unrealistic 
expectations are just and reasonable and that 
(c) relevant sociopolitical systems are rigged to favor others and exploit 
or oppress them, notwithstanding that: 
                                                            
16 An example of this disagreement is the difference of opinion between Marxists and Weberians 
over the role of religion in the development of European capitalism. Max Weber thought 
considered the “worldly asceticism” of the early Protestant Reformers, the Calvinists in 
particular, an essential part of the explanation of why capitalism developed in the West rather 
than the East.  Marxists insist that capitalist relations of production developed in Europe earlier 
than Weber thought, and that Protestant ethics were more an effect of this transformation than 
a cause.  See Anthony Giddens, “Introduction” to Weber, op. cit., vii et seq.       
13
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(d) these systems (which can never be perfect) are generally successful in 
rewarding meritorious individuals and groups and disfavoring those 
who lack merit. 
 
These conflicting perspectives draw attention to a number of important, 
still unanswered questions about the resolution of structural conflicts.  The 
theory of structural violence seems to assume that the existence and character 
of relevant social systems is a matter of common knowledge.  But the system’s 
role in generating conflict may itself be a major subject of contention between 
the parties.  Although all parties to intense conflicts personalize their enemy to 
some extent, the rebels tend to be determinist vis a vis the system.  That is, 
they blame an unjust social order, and those representing or profiting it, for 
failing to satisfy the legitimate needs and expectations of less favored groups.17  
The system’s defenders, on the other hand, tend to attribute such groups’ 
misfortunes to their failure to meet legitimate standards.  That is, they tend to 
be voluntarist vis a vis disfavored groups.  A classic example is their tendency 
to blame a high rate of unemployment on unemployed people’s personal or 
collective failings (laziness, indiscipline, unwillingness to stay in school, 
disrupted families, etc.), rather than seeing it as a product of late capitalist 
structural features and a cause of personal or cultural problems.18    
How, indeed, is the conflict-causing system to be identified and defined?  
The existence and functions of social systems are not self-evident; they are 
matters of inference to be determined by interpreting events and people’s 
behavior.  The parties to a serious social conflict may therefore agree that its 
sources are to some degree systemic, but still disagree strongly about the 
nature and dynamics of the system.  Such disagreements (a form of what Oliver 
Ramsbotham calls “radical disagreement”) are fairly common.19  To many 
libertarians, the state is the culprit responsible for much human misery, 
whereas others tend to focus on the system’s socioeconomic or cultural 
dimensions.  Many left-leaning analysts, when asked what system is 
responsible for violence in Africa or the Middle East, would immediately 
respond, “capitalist imperialism,” while many on the right would name 
“militant Islam” or “tribalized politics.”  How should a would-be peacemaker 
approach radical differences of this sort, which involve conflicting narratives as 
well as clashes of philosophy and political values?         
  
Before suggesting answers to this question, it may be useful to note the 
range and major types of systems that tend to produce radical disagreements.20  
                                                            
17 A good illustration is Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of 
Liberation (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). 
18 See Thomas Janoski, et al., The Causes of Structural Unemployment: Four Factors that Keep People 
from the Jobs They Deserve (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014); Charles E. Hurst, Social Inequality: 
Forms, Causes, and Consequences (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). 
19 See Oliver Ramsbotham, Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and 
Survival.  Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010. 
20 Although protracted conflicts can themselves be analyzed as “dynamical systems,” as Peter T. 
Coleman does in works like The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to Seemingly Impossible Conflicts 
14
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Legal and political systems define de jure and de facto constitutions that 
distribute legitimacy, authority, and influence among groups incorporated in a 
body politic.  Socioeconomic systems define modes of production that distribute 
property, economic roles, and privileges among groups incorporated in an 
economic market.  Cultural systems define modes of discourse and behavioral 
norms that distribute social roles, status, and access to the means of 
communication among groups incorporated in a cultural network.  A trend 
noted by social analysts since Hegel is that these systems tend to become 
increasingly integrated as history takes its course.  Disagreements about the 
causal primacy of this systemic type or that persist, as do arguments about the 
relationship between social structure and individual agency.21  Clearly, 
“nesting” is too simple and straightforward a metaphor to describe complex 
inter-system relationships.  For example, structural integration, which tends 
toward the creation of a single global System, does not mean the elimination of 
contradictions; it may actually intensify key contradictions.22 Even so, an 
adequate analysis of any social system must take into account its political, 
cultural, and socioeconomic dimensions and determinants.  
Consider, for example, the U.S. legal/political system, one of whose 
manifestations is the incarceration of about 1.5 million Americans, a higher 
percentage of the population per capita than any other nation on earth.23  The 
essential role of the socioeconomic system in producing this violence can 
hardly be doubted in light of more than fifty years of research concluding that 
crime rates (rates of violent crime in particular) rise predictably with increased 
unemployment, lower income levels, the economic decline of neighborhoods, 
and growing income and wealth inequality.24  The authors of the pioneering 
U.S. Crime Commission report, “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” 
(1965), put the matter simply: “Warring on poverty, inadequate housing and 
unemployment, is warring on crime.”25  A more recent transnational study 
                                                            
(New York: Public Affairs, 2011), the discussion here focuses on the social context of such 
conflicts. 
21 See, e.g., my discussion of Anthony Giddens’ perspective in Resolving Structural Conflicts, op.cit. 
at 12-13, 63-65. 
22 Slavoj Zizek makes this argument in Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical 
Materialism (London and New York: Verso, 2013), 245 et seq.  
23 See The Sentencing Project, “Trends in U.S. Corrections” (2015), 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf  
The same study shows almost four million people “under the control” of the U.S. corrections 
system. 
24 See the comprehensive and judicious summary of research in “The Causes of Crime,” David F. 
Greenberg’s Introduction to Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist Criminology (Philadelphia, 
PA: Temple University Press, 1993), 58-99.  For updated research, see Elliott Currie, Crime and 
Punishment in America, Rev. Ed. (London and New York: Picador, 2013), 106-142.   
25 “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,” Report of the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1967), 6. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf 
The same conclusion is reached with more elaboration by James S. Campbell, et al., of the Task 
Force on Law and Law Enforcement of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention 
of Violence in their report entitled, “Law and Order Reconsidered” (1970), 44 et seq. 
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extends the same analysis globally, but puts special emphasis in the correlation 
of overall economic growth, income inequality, and violent crime: 
Both economic growth and income inequality are robust determinants 
of violent crime rates. Furthermore, even after controlling for country-
specific effects (including systematic measurement error), there is clear 
evidence that violent crime is self-perpetuating. These variables 
(economic growth, inequality, and past crime rates) worked well for 
homicides and remarkably well for robbery rates. Their sign and 
statistical significance survived the addition of other explanatory 
variables, including measures of crime deterrence, illicit drug activities, 
demographic characteristics, and cultural traits.26  
It is not only crime that increases with the growth of social inequality, 
but also a wide variety of violent intergroup conflicts, including ethno-national, 
racial, and religious struggles.  As a recent study by Ravi Kanbur for the 
International Peace Academy puts it, “Theory and evidence support the view 
that it is the between -group dimension of inequality that is crucial.  Given 
structural cleavages such as caste, religion, ethnicity, race and region, if income 
disparities align with these splits they exacerbate tension and conflict.”27  This 
finding has important implications for the connection of crime with the 
operations of the cultural system, as we will see in a moment. 
Given the relatively clear connections between poverty, inequality, and 
crime outlined above, one might expect conflict specialists to seek to resolve 
the conflict between lawbreakers and authorities by helping the parties 
discover how to eliminate these conditions.  The difficulty, however, is that 
that poverty and inequality have persisted and even deepened (along with 
“precarity,” the mode of existence one step removed from poverty in which vast 
numbers of working people currently find themselves), notwithstanding more 
then eighty years of strenuous effort to mitigate them by creating capitalist 
welfare states.  To some analysts, this persistence suggests that economic 
misery is systemically generated – a product of globalizing capitalism at its 
current stage of development.  If so, elimination of the problem will very likely 
require some sort of large-scale system transformation.28  This is not a 
                                                            
https://archive.org/stream/laworderreconsid00camprich/laworderreconsid00camprich_djvu.tx
t    
26 Pablo Fajnzylber, et al., “What Causes Violent Crime?” European Economic Review 46 (2002), 
1323-1357 at 1349.  Cf. Elliott Currie, op. cit., at 120: “Countries where there is a wide gap 
between rich and poor routinely show higher levels of violent crime . . . . Societies with weak 
‘safety nets’ for the poor and economically insecure are more likely than others at a comparable 
level of development to be wracked by violence.” 
27 Ravi Kanbur, “Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link.” Coping With Crisis Working Paper 
Series (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 3.  See also Henri Jan Brinkman, et al., 
“Addressing Horizontal Inequalities as Drivers of Conflict in the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda.” (New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office, February, 2013). 
28 See, for example, Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Universtiy Press, 2013); David Harvey, Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic 
Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
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prospect most analysts view with pleasure or even resigned acceptance.  For a 
number of reasons, including the ideological legacy of the Cold War, the 
unevenness of economic development, and the dizzying pace of technological 
change, conflict specialists (among others) tend to avert their gaze from the 
systemic socioeconomic causes of poverty and crime.  Instead, they are likely to 
conceive of clashes between criminals and authorities as grounded primarily in 
racial, ethnic, and cultural attitudes.  The result is a tendency to classify 
conflicts between ‘the police’ and ‘the community’ as identity-group struggles 
rather than as products of the class structure.    
This classification (dating back to the Kerner Commission’s 1968 
Report on U.S. racial disorders) leads quite naturally to the multiplication of 
academic studies, intergroup dialogues, and government-funded projects 
designed to improve police-community relations.29  These efforts have 
produced a number of reform programs, some of which have apparently had a 
favorable impact on police-community relations. 30 Nevertheless, it seems clear 
that the continuing state of war between authorities and lawbreakers in many 
communities will continue until the conflict’s systemic socioeconomic causes 
have also been identified and removed.  As Elliott Currie puts it the updated 
2013 edition of Crime and Punishment in America: 
Today, as in the 1990s, the United States is distinguished by its 
unusually high levels of poverty, its wide spread of income 
inequality, and its relatively weak and hesitant provision of social 
benefits to the vulnerable. The key difference is that these problems 
have worsened since the first edition [of this book], and that has a 
great deal to do with why America’s cities remain the most violent in 
the advanced industrial world.31 
   
  These words resound with particular force: “America’s cities remain the 
most violent in the advanced industrial world.”  People lacking a systemic 
framework for interpreting this reality are unable to understand that, where 
crime and punishment are concerned, the fundamental problem is neither bad 
criminals nor bad cops., but a social system that has turned large urban areas 
into war zones.  In a war zone, one is not surprised to learn that soldiers 
frequently abuse their power and brutalize civilians, or that armed civilians 
consider soldiers their enemy and fair game for retaliation.  In most discussions 
of the crime/punishment syndrome, however, the extent to which all the actors 
in the drama play roles scripted by the economic structure as well as by 
cultural attitudes is downplayed or even ignored.  Furthermore, those averse to 
system analysis often reduce the cultural system to a set of racially biased 
                                                            
29 See Report of National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968).   
30 David L. Carter, The Police and the Community, 7th Ed. (London and New York: Pearson, 2001); 
Vinita Pandey, “Community Policing for Conflict Resolution and Community Reslience.” 
International Journal of Social Work and Human Services Practice, 2:6 (December 2014, 228-33); 
http://www.hrpub.org/download/20141201/IJRH4-19290153.pdf; Megan Clare Price, “The 
Processes and Partnerships Behind Insight Policing. Criminal Justice Policy Review (2015), 1-15.   
31 Elliott Currie, op. cit., 223.  
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thoughts and behaviors rather than seeing racism as part of a discursive 
structure linking ideas about “us” and “them” to praxes involving the family, 
work, the nation, and religious or ethical values.  The result of this habit of 
thought is to obscure the links between the cultural and socioeconomic 
systems. 
  Clearly, in important respects, the clash between police and 
communities in many Western nations is also a racial or ethnic identity group 
struggle.  Reliable statistics in the U.S. and U.K. show that a 
disproportionately high number of people of color are arrested, convicted, and 
imprisoned for crime and suffer its effects as victims.32  There is no longer 
much doubt that police and prosecutors focus particularly intense attention on 
ethnic and racial ghettos, that racial profiling takes place as a matter of course, 
and that many criminal laws and institutions are designed to treat people of 
color more harshly than whites.33  But, Elliott Currie is surely right to insist 
that the underlying reality is an overlap between economic deprivation and 
race.  “Being poor in America means being at the bottom of an exceptionally 
harsh system of inequality; being black greatly increases the chances of being 
impoverished and, therefore, trapped at the lower end of the social ladder.”  
Empirical studies show a particularly sharp correlation between extreme 
poverty and crime, with the result that extremely poor white neighborhoods 
“suffered more violence than somewhat less poor, but still deprived black 
communities.  And they suffered almost twice the violent crime rates of black 
neighborhoods characterized by ‘low’ poverty.” 34   
  Pierre Bourdieu and Johan Galtung explain this by noting that in many 
societies, direct violence, such as police brutality against minorities, is visible 
and outrageous, while structural violence seems so ‘natural’ as to be virtually 
invisible.35  But, this seems a bit facile.  As Galtung’s theory suggests, 
structural, cultural, and direct violence produce each other.  Moreover, the 
violence attributable to class structure is not really invisible.  When people lose 
their jobs or their homes because of business failures or relocations, when some 
under-employed people turn to drugs, alcohol, or criminal activities, or when 
whole neighborhoods or regions are depressed by economic reversals, these 
                                                            
32 See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 
op. cit.; Shaun L. Gabbidon and Helen Taylor Greene, Race and Crime, 4th Ed. (New York: Sage, 
2015); U.K. Ministry of Justice, Statistic on Race and the Justice System, 2014 (26 November 2015). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/480250/bull
etin.pdf 
33 A commonly cited example is the law punishing the sale and possession of crack cocaine more 
severely than the sale and possession of powdered cocaine.  But there is also a vast differential in 
the enforcement of laws against street crime and “white collar” crime.  See D.O. Friedrichs, 
Trusted Criminals: White-Collar Crime in Contemporary Society, 4th Ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2009). 
See also the well-researched senior honors thesis by Joseph P. Martinez, “Unpunished 
Criminals: The Social Acceptability of White Collar Crimes in America.” (Ypsilanti, MI: Eastern 
Michigan University, 2014). 
http://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1381&context=honors 
34 Elliott Currie, op. cit., 122, 126. 
35 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” op. cit. at 295; Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: 
Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field.” Sociological Theory, 12:1 (March 1994), 3-4. 
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effects are quite visible.    
  In fact, what disappears from view in such cases is the connection 
between these violent effects and their systemic causes.  The sufferers and their 
neighbors have learned not to view the business closure or the depressed 
neighborhood as an avoidable insult to their basic needs produced by a profit-
driven system.  The messages delivered constantly and in multifarious ways by 
cultural agencies ranging from the school and church to news shows and 
television dramas are that business trends (and catastrophes) are as mysterious 
and uncontrollable as the weather; that the ‘free market’ system is basically 
beneficent and healthy, although it occasionally needs tweaking; that, in any 
case, there is no conceivably better alternative system; and that individuals are 
ultimately morally responsible for their own economic destiny.36  These 
networked beliefs serve as a particularly dramatic illustration of the integration 
of the socioeconomic and deep-cultural systems, which collaborate to shift the 
attention of both in-groups and protest groups away from systemic defects and 
toward the personal level of analysis.  All parties are invited to participate in 
the mode of thought and behavior that I have elsewhere termed “partisan 
moralism” – a propensity to personalize struggles by classifying warring 
parties either as innocent or culpable, as ‘good guys’ or ‘bad guys.’  “Parties 
who earn the positive label are thought of as well-intentioned, rational actors 
defending themselves against unjustified aggression, while those branded 
wrongdoers are considered malicious or deluded fanatics with a natural bent 
toward cruelty and violence.”37 
  Partisan moralism is particularly evident in attempts to rally support 
for efforts by powerful nation-states to impose their will on other states or on 
dissident groups such as those named as enemies in the so-called “war on 
terror.”  This highly personalized, Manichean form of nationalist ideology 
distracts attention from another violence-generating system – a globalized 
structure of production and power that some analysts term neo-imperialism.   
  It may help, to begin with, to distinguish neo-imperialism from 
globalization per se.  Globalization is a multi-faceted, self-engendering process 
involving the rapid multiplication and proliferation of transnational contacts 
and relationships of all sorts.   It takes place when diverse peoples visit or trade 
with each other, learn each other’s songs, contract each other’s diseases, or 
marry each other’s children.  Neo-imperialism is globalization promoted, 
shaped, and ultimately limited by elites driven to expand their own commercial 
infrastructure and values, modes of research and communication, and basic 
principles of government, education, and social life.  What globalizing elites 
send abroad, of course, is an ‘export version’ of their home system – a technique 
first developed by the Romans in order to diffuse the fundamentals of Roman 
Law throughout their empire.38  Even so, it is a total system that is exported, 
                                                            
36 The classic study of the impact of these messages on industrial workers in the U.S. is Richard 
Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993).  
See also Nancy Isenberg, White Trash: The 400 Year Untold History of Class in America (New 
York: Viking, 2016). 
37 Resolving Structural Conflicts, op. cit. 7. 
38 See, e.g., George Mousourakis, Roman Law and the Origins of the Civil Law Tradition (New 
York: Springer, 2015), esp. 84 et seq. 
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including socioeconomic, political, and cultural structures.  
  This neo-imperial system, I believe, provides the structural context 
needed to help us to understand the plague of religious violence and related 
warfare that has beset the world since the 1980s.  After a long period of 
relative silence, the study of empire, fueled by the perception that the United 
States has succeeded to the role once played by the old imperial powers, has 
again become acceptable in some academic and journalistic circles.  An early 
study of the conflict between Muslim jihadists and pro-Western forces named 
the neo-imperial system “McWorld”: Benjamin Barber’s way of describing the 
rapid and pervasive spread of American hegemony around the globe after 1945, 
culminating in the United States’ emergence as the world’s sole military 
superpower following the Cold War.39  This vast expansion of influence has 
been perceived by many groups abroad, particularly in volatile, resource-rich 
regions subject to foreign economic and military intervention, as an invasion 
that undermines local and regional autonomy, divides and conquers subject 
peoples, generates massive political corruption, disrupts long-established 
patterns of social interaction, and exposes local communities to a barrage of 
imports that challenge traditional religious values and threaten people’s core 
identities.  It therefore generates numerous forms of violence, including 
rebellion, repression, and inter-imperialist warfare. 
  “Invasion,” in the case of neo-imperialism, is more than a metaphor.  
The modern era of religious politicization and extremism began with the 
Iranian Revolution of the 1970s and accelerated in the following decade with 
U.S. aid to jihadi forces rebelling against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  
It did not involve attacks against the West, however, until the President 
George H.W. Bush sent an army to Saudi Arabia and invaded Kuwait in 1991.  
The stated purpose of the invasion was to expel Iraqi president Saddam 
Hussein’s troops from Kuwait, but Bush’s war was also intended to inaugurate 
a new era of U.S. neo-imperial activism by overcoming the so-called ‘Vietnam 
syndrome’ and eliminating Saddam’s Iraq as a major player in Middle Eastern 
affairs.40  The first communiqué issued by al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden 
called for the U.S. to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia’s sacred soil, 
terminate military operations and deadly civil sanctions against Iraq, and end 
its one-sided support to Israel.41  Little more than a decade later, lured by the 
promise of oil wealth, regional ‘democratization,’ and the establishment of U.S. 
control over the region, the second President Bush invaded Iraq proper.  
Saddam Hussein was deposed and killed, and the region was plunged into 
sectarian chaos.  From the recipients’ perspective, it seemed clear that, stylistic 
differences aside, the Americans’ neo-imperial ‘mission’ differed hardly at all 
                                                            
39 Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995). 
40 On March 1, 1991, in the midst of Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), President Bush gave a 
speech at the Executive Office Building in Washington, D.C. in which he stated, “It’s a proud 
day for America.  And we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19351. On U.S. war aims, see my Reasons to Kill: 
Why Americans Choose War (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), 139-43. 
41 See Sharon Otterman, “Saudi Arabia: Withdrawal of U.S. Forces.”  Council on Foreign 
Relations Backgrounder, May 2, 2003. http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-
withdrawl-us-forces/p7739 
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from that of the Western imperialists who had carved up the Middle East 
following World War I, and who had dominated most of the non-Western 
world ever since the eighteenth century.  
  Military imposition, however, is not an adequate explanation for either 
the relative success of the neo-imperial project or the current wave of 
rebellions against it.  Although force was clearly used to expand and maintain 
the system, it is also true that certain groups in the receiving nations welcomed 
the spread of Western economic activity and cultural products in their lands, at 
least up to a point.  Younger, more urbanized people in particular displayed 
great interest in Western consumer goods, technologies, and fashions, in 
greater freedom of expression, travel, and opportunities to study in Europe or 
America, in gender rights, internet access, and parliamentary democracy, on-
line investment opportunities, pop music, and religious pluralism, not to 
mention TV satellite dishes, mobile phones, and a whole panoply of American 
and European lifestyles and politico-cultural values.42  Yet the desire for these 
goods and services can be intensely ambivalent and guilt-producing, since they 
threaten traditional identities, patterns of social order, and belief systems, and 
often extract a heavy price in the loss of personal dignity and national 
independence.  For decades, to cite just one example, this price has included the 
wholesale bribery of public officials and business executives in nations 
incorporated into the neo-imperial system.43  Intense ambivalence about 
Western mores may help to explain why the al Qaeda operatives living in 
Florida prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. targets imbibed alcohol 
and visited strip bars before going into battle; it was one way to ‘sharpen the 
contradictions.’44       
  The two faces of neo-imperialism are therefore intimidation and 
temptation, a combination that has been a potent stimulus to religious 
rebellions throughout history.  One recalls the popular resistance to the French 
in the Mahgreb, to the British in old China, India, and East Africa, to the 
Russians in Central Asia, and to the United States in Iraq.  Everywhere that 
secular leadership was unwilling or unable to push back against foreign 
political and economic domination, religious leaders mobilized mass 
insurgencies by fusing traditional values and behaviors with modern ideas and 
organizing techniques.  Religious movements not only offered followers the 
opportunity to purify themselves and defend their traditions, they often 
provided the only opposition capable of organizing across the lines of class, 
region, and ethnicity.  Moreover, they linked the promise of personal 
transformation – repentance and spiritual rebirth – to the achievement of social 
reform.  Frequently, they practiced what they preached by organizing social 
welfare and relief programs that corrupt or callous governments seemed 
                                                            
42 Barber, op. cit., 17-20, passim. See also Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: 
Understanding Globalization (New York: Picador, 2012), which portrays the process as 
essentially consumer-driven. 
43 See, e.g., Janine Wedel, The Shadow Elite: How the World’s New Power Brokers Undermine 
Democracy, Government, and the Free Market (New York: Basic Books, 2009). 
44 Cf. Juan Cole, “Sharpening Contradictions: Why al-Qaeda attacked Satirists in Paris.” 
Informed Comment (January 7, 2015). http://www.juancole.com/2015/01/sharpening-
contradictions-satirists.html. 
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incapable of providing, as well as organizing resistance to imperial claims and 
impositions.  These examples of sacrificial action linked to promises of personal 
and social transformation appealed to many believers at a time when secular 
movements that promised radical change had been discredited, and when 
Western thought no longer inspired movements of cultural revival and 
national liberation.  Given the choice between a pallid, collaborationist 
secularism and a fiery religious fundamentalism, it is not surprising that many 
people yearning for change preferred the latter.    
  This analysis, of course, may be challenged by those who do not believe 
that “neo-imperialism” accurately describes the current global order or the U.S. 
role in creating and maintaining it.  Similarly, some may object that I have not 
accurately described the systemic basis for poverty and inequality in the United 
States and the role of socioeconomic conditions in producing crime and mass 
incarceration.  Those challenges are welcome, so long as they lead to a full 
discussion of the role played by social systems, as well as individual decisions 
and attitudes, in generating structural and direct violence.  One might say, 
then, that the first responsibility of a peacemaker, in the context of structural 
violence, is to facilitate discussions among individuals and groups about the 
extent to which social systems are generating violence, the nature of those 
systems, and the most effective ways to transform them.     
Systemic Change and the Peacemaker’s Responsibility 
 
  For would-be peacemakers, two forms of responsibility in the context of 
structural violence seem preeminent.  The first is their responsibility to help 
move thinking about mass incarceration, the “war on terror” and other forms of 
state-supported violence out of the mode of partisan moralism and toward 
identification and analysis of the social systems that generate them.  The 
second is to develop practical methods of assisting conflicting parties to 
transform violent systems into systems of peace.  The problem, in a nutshell, is 
how to accomplish a socioeconomic and cultural transformation that is both 
radical and nonviolent.  Inegalitarian structures that fail to satisfy basic human 
needs generate violent conflict in two ways: directly, as when social classes 
struggle for economic and political supremacy, and indirectly, as when 
frustrated people conditioned to think of themselves in national, racial, ethnic, 
or religious terms hold other identity-groups responsible for their problems 
and target them for punishment.  Conflict resolution requires that ranked 
socioeconomic structures be altered in order to satisfy the basic needs and vital 
interests of lower class and lower status groups.  But how can this be 
accomplished without provoking violence by the old regime and its 
challengers?  And, if a nonviolent social transformation is feasible, what roles 
can specialists in conflict resolution play in the process?   
  The first question demands attention because of the historic association 
of radical social transformations with intense mass violence.  In some situations 
where the goal was to replace or alter legal and political institutions without 
overturning the old socioeconomic order, significant change took place without 
large-scale bloodshed.  The nonviolent movement led by Mohandas Gandhi 
and the Congress Party ousted the British from India, and the campaign led by 
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Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress overthrew the apartheid 
system in South Africa, without a revolutionary civil war, but also without 
reordering those nations’ socioeconomic structures and priorities.45  Other 
upheavals that aimed at transforming the system of class and property 
relations as well as the system of governance proved more destructive.  In 
certain instances  (the Russian and Chinese revolutions come to mind), 
significant system changes were, indeed, accomplished, but state and 
revolutionary violence exacted a high price both in human lives and subsequent 
political deformation.  Of course, this does not mean that leaving an old social 
regime in place produces peace!  The slow collapse of a defunct system (for 
example, the centuries-long decay of feudalism in Europe) can be even more 
costly, generating religious upheavals, communal wars, and struggles between 
secular rulers, as well as horrendous structural violence.   
          This history must give us pause.  It should also lead us to understand 
that our social thought and peacemaking practice remain uncomfortably 
constrained by a dichotomous understanding of “reform” and “revolution.”  For 
example, we know that in some cases, significant socioeconomic changes were 
made relatively rapidly without serious violence.  One recalls the mass 
mobilizations led by New Dealers in the United States and social democrats in 
Europe that legitimized the labor movement and created the welfare/interest 
group state.46  During the 1930s in the U.S., a series of hard-fought strikes and 
demonstrations led by far-left organizations posed the threat of a violent mass 
uprising and enabled those advocating structural reforms to portray 
themselves as relative moderates.  Revolutionary violence was avoided, 
although many of the tactics employed by the labor movement were either 
quasi-legal or illegal and were branded violent by the old regime.  Such 
innovations in the U.S. as ‘sit-down strikes’ (i.e., factory occupations) and ‘one-
cent sales’ (mass demonstrations to prevent property foreclosures) were 
borderline tactics that the state decided not to challenge in order to avoid a 
dangerous conflict escalation.  One also recalls that American courts declared 
much of the original New Deal legislative program unconstitutional before the 
U.S. Supreme Court finally decided to validate it.     
        Interestingly, the size and militancy of the mass movement seems to 
correlate positively with the avoidance of civil violence.  When people are 
politically aroused to demand significant structural change, but also have the 
organized means to express themselves collectively, nonviolent 
                                                            
45 Barrington Moore discussed “the price of peaceful change” in India in Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World, op. cit. at  
See also Alex Callinicos, “South Africa After Apartheid.” Socialist Review: 70 (March 1996). 
http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj70/safrica.htm.  Of course, the 40-year struggle 
against apartheid involved periods of armed struggle, state repression, extra-judicial killings, 
and mass uprisings in the townships.  See Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Eds., Mandela, 
Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle Against Apartheid, 1948-1990 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). 
46 See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New 
York: Harper, 2009); Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of 
American Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); William A. Pelz, Against 
Capitalism: The European Left on the March (Peter Lang, 2007). 
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transformations can occur.   That being said, the extent to which these reform 
movements actually succeeded in altering the old social system remains a 
matter of debate.  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s enemies branded him a 
revolutionary tyrant, and the new principles and institutions brought to life by 
the New Deal were more than cosmetic, but in hindsight, the claim that his 
administration rescued American capitalism by reforming labor-management 
relations, strengthening the social “safety net,” and regulating the banking and 
securities industries seems not at all far-fetched.47  While the changes 
implemented by the New Deal and social-democratic movements were in some 
ways substantial, they did not eliminate old classes or create new ones, 
permanently reverse relations of class domination/subordination, or transform 
the system of property relations that reflects and embodies the power of these 
groupings. This leaves us with a key question that current social science has 
done little to answer.  How can we evaluate the transformative potential of a 
specific reform program?  To do this requires a better understanding of the 
processes of system change than scholarship now possesses.    
          A second example of substantial nonviolent socioeconomic change is the 
rapid and unexpected movement of former Communist systems in the direction 
of capitalism that has taken place over the past two or three decades in Russia, 
the former Soviet republics and satellites, China, and Vietnam.  In the former 
U.S.S.R. and its dependencies, as well as in Yugoslavia, the old system virtually 
collapsed and was replaced by a version of Western-style oligopoly capitalism, 
while in China and Vietnam, capitalist institutions and markets were permitted 
to develop under Communist Party control.  Major questions concerning these 
developments remain unanswered.  Was violence largely avoided because 
bureaucratic elites were able to maintain political power or to transform 
themselves into business elites under the new system?  Can the parties now in 
control of formerly Communist regimes prevent the return of the gross 
inequalities and related social ills associated with capitalism?  Do their 
activities in the world represent a new model of international behavior, or are 
they repeating the process of empire building that has so often led to global 
warfare?    
      Even with these major issues awaiting exploration, the historical 
materials suggest that rapid and far-reaching socioeconomic changes can be 
made without unleashing state and revolutionary violence, at least under 
certain conditions, and that conflict specialists can play useful roles in 
facilitating processes of transformation.  Taking Crane Brinton’s classic study 
of violent revolutions, The Anatomy of Revolution, as a rough template, one can 
imagine an “Anatomy of Nonviolent Transformation” that would involve the 
following stages of development:      
 
1. The old social system’s functions and basic unfairness become evident, provoking 
multifarious and contradictory demands for change.   
                                                            
47 See, e.g., Barton J. Bernstein, Toward a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New 
York: Pantheon, 1968). 
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  Historians such as Brinton discuss the decline of the ancien regime at 
length, emphasizing the role played by the “transfer of allegiance of the 
intellectuals” in delegitimizing old authority systems.48  Conflict specialists can 
play a role in this process by focusing attention on the systemic causes of social 
problems, the forms of structural violence, and the possibilities of helping to 
create less violent systems.  Like the French Encyclopedists, scholars in 
conflict studies and related fields can produce publications, new course offerings, 
conferences, and practice projects applying the ‘structural turn’ to specific issues of 
class and class conflict.  The audiences for such presentations can be students, 
community residents, journalists, or policymakers.  In January 2016, for 
example, several scholar/activists at George Mason University’s School for 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution organized a two-day conference at United 
Nations headquarters in New York to discuss “Poverty, Inequality, and Global 
Conflict,” and to consider what types of national and international policies 
might help to solve the problems of system-generated violence.  A report of the 
conference was distributed to a group of ‘opinion-makers’ who could help 
spread the word that poverty and inequality were systemic causes of violence 
that needed to be combated by new national and international policies, as well 
as new community-based programs. 49   
2. In a growing atmosphere of crisis, mass movements organize and demand that 
substantial changes, not yet carefully specified, be made in the old system.  They 
support their demands by resorting to unusual political tactics.      
  A further sign that the situation may be ripe for systemic change is the 
emergence of political movements both to the left and to the right of 
established elite-dominated parties.  This indicates that people are moving 
toward accepting the need for some sort of social and political reconstruction, 
although they have not yet agreed on its content.  As feelings of 
disenchantment with the existing socioeconomic order spread, people feel the 
need for public and private discussions of what has gone wrong with the 
system and what the possibilities are of changing it.  Under these 
circumstances, conflict resolvers are well positioned to facilitate various forms 
of public dialogue that may be convened by community groups to help people air 
their discontents, identify key social structures requiring alteration, and 
envisage possible methods of altering them.50  They can offer to inform 
political groups formally or informally of the results of relevant academic 
                                                            
48 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1965), 39 et seq. 
49 The Conference on Poverty, Inequality, and Global Conflict (January 11-12, 2106) was 
cosponsored by George Mason University, the UN Academic Impact, and the Chicago-based 
People Program International.  The Conference Report is available from the School for Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution at scar.gmu.edu. 
50 See, for example, the descriptions of “public dialogue,” “policy dialogue,” and “public 
conversations” at Beyond Intractability (Peter S. Adler and Kristi Parker Celico, “Policy 
Dialogue,” December 2003). http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/policy-dialogue. See 
also Public Conversations Project website, http://www.publicconversations.org/. 
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research, as well as undertaking new research needed to throw further light on 
systemic problems and possible solutions.  Skilled facilitators can also offer to 
assist such groups to work through their internal differences and/or their 
differences with competing organizations by using the problem-solving workshop 
methods developed by practitioners like John Burton, Herbert Kelman, and 
Christopher Mitchell, the sustained dialogue approach pioneered by Harold 
Saunders, Johan Galtung’s transcend and transform methods, and other relevant 
techniques for intergroup analysis and communication.51  These techniques, 
originally designed to deal with ultra-violent ethno-nationalist conflicts, may 
be well suited to facilitate discussions reflecting disagreements about the 
nature of the conflict-generating system.    
3. As ferment spreads, social-constitutional discussions erupt on street corners, in 
churches, and in workplaces, while economic and social experiments take place 
in numerous communities. 
  People mobilizing for change select new leaders at the local as well as 
national and international levels.  Rather than await the outcome of some final 
struggle, however, they begin to imagine and implement local solutions to the 
problems that most concern them.  Conflict specialists can play various useful 
roles in this process, including advising the members of new organizations how to 
use tactics that are militant and nonviolent, and how to employ conflict resolution 
techniques in dealing with their political adversaries.  Moreover, they are well 
positioned to investigate, evaluate, and publicize the community-based programs 
and experimental projects that have already begun to appear in response to 
perceptions that the current socioeconomic system is in crisis.   
  In contemplating further system change, people want to know ‘what 
works.’  What existing programs already help to get young people in poor 
neighborhoods off the streets, provide them with useful, well-paid work, and 
keep them out of the hands of violent gangs?52  How have older people and 
others declared ‘superfluous’ by the market economy managed to provide 
services for each other in exchange for ‘time-dollars’: a program now operating 
in more than 30 U.S. cities?53  What alternative forms of cooperative business 
and public service enterprise already permit workers and local residents in 
scores of communities to own their own companies and plan their own 
economic futures?54  Some activists believe that the spread of these local 
                                                            
51 See Chapter Two, supra, at 46-47. 
52 Unfortunately, most programs designed to combat or prevent gang violence define the gang 
problem in noneconomic terms and do not contain plans for economic reconstruction of poor 
communities.  Some, however, have had produced good results, however, temporary, in 
lowering rates of violence.  See James C. Howell, “Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research 
and Programs.”  OJJPD Juvenile Justice Bulletin.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (December 2010). 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231116.pdf  
53 Edgar S. Cahn, No More Throw-Away People: The Co-Production Imperative, 2d Ed.  (London: 
Essential Books, Ltd., 2004) 
54 Gar Alperovitz, What Then Must We Do? Straight Talk About the Next American Revolution 
(White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishers, 2013).  
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initiatives and cooperative enterprises is the key to a nonviolent socioeconomic 
transformation. 55   Others fear that local movements will be co-opted or 
repressed as struggle intensifies.  Conflict specialists can make a valuable 
contribution to the discussion by studying and evaluating the evidence for 
these claims and working to develop programs that they believe are 
transformative.           
4. Political conflict intensifies at local and national levels, with old elites dividing 
and political coalitions reorganizing to support competing visions of system 
change.  Specific programs for structural transformation are presented to the 
public in elections, referenda, and other forms of public decision-making. 
   As political conflict escalates and moves toward a possible resolution, 
conflict specialists could play very important, although virtually unprecedented 
roles in facilitating agreement on a new social constitution.  All the ‘third 
party’ techniques mentioned earlier can be employed to assist the parties to 
reach specific agreements on needed changes.  Moreover, conflict resolvers 
skilled in improvising new public decision-making processes could help design 
political forums to permit open and thoughtful discussion of proposed 
structural changes.56  They could also advise conflicting parties how to deal 
with two factors that often obstruct nonviolent agreement on new 
socioeconomic relations: elite groups’ fear of total loss, and all parties’ 
reluctance to consent to irrevocable changes.  Conflict resolvers will 
understand the need to assure privileged groups that changes agreed upon will 
not render them non-people, expose them to vengeance, or ignore their basic 
human needs.  They will also work to ensure that any new structural 
arrangement embodies the ‘principle of reversibility.’  In the same way that 
citizens can now work to amend a political constitution, the parties to class 
conflicts need to be assured that restructured socioeconomic systems can also 
be re-altered to reflect changes in the popular will.  
This brings our discussion full circle.  The work of peaceful system 
transformation must involve public education on a large scale.  Strenuous new 
efforts are required to help our fellow citizens and fellow humans worldwide, at 
a time of increasing insecurity and frustration, to move beyond partisan 
moralism to a new appreciation of their own responsibility and the system’s 
responsibility for avoidable violence.  The bad news is that, where violent 
conflict is concerned, no party to the conflict and few bystanders are guiltless.  
As the Rolling Stones sing (in “Sympathy for the Devil”), “I shouted out/Who 
killed the Kennedys?/When after all/It was you and me.”57  The good news is 
                                                            
55 The project is described at http://democracycollaborative.org/content/next-system-project 
and thenextsystem.org.  
53 Lawrence E. Susskind and Sarah McKearnan, ‘The Evolution of Public Policy Dispute 
Resolution.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, 16:2 (Summer, 1999), 96-115  
57 Jagger/Richards, “Sympathy for the Devil.” 
https://play.google.com/music/preview/T6skkbvlhhlrxcsk6p5otkauqmm?lyrics=1&utm_sourc
e=google&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=lyrics&pcampaignid=kp-lyrics 
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that no party is solely responsible for violence sponsored or provoked by an 
oppressive social structure.  And the best news is that, once people decide to 
transform such a structure, they can help each other to do so.  Each of these 
steps – acknowledging responsibility for violence, perceiving that a system is 
also responsible for it, and deciding to change that system through collective 
effort – challenges peacemakers to overcome serious (but not insuperable) 
political and psychological obstacles to public understanding of such issues.  
That, I believe, is their particular professional and ethical responsibility.   
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